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Abstract 
The structure of  China’s current governance bears prominent features of  fiscal decentralization. The 
supply of  healthcare resources in China has clearly witnessed slower growth in the last two decades 
during which the fiscal decentralization process has taken place. Using China’s provincial panel data, 
we examine the determinants of  healthcare resource supply while paying particular attention to the 
role of  fiscal decentralization. We find that the supply of  healthcare resources is inversely related to 
the degree of  decentralization, which, using spatial econometrics, is attributed to the presence of  
strategic substitutes in healthcare spending across city governments. These findings have important 
implications for policy makers in making fiscal arrangements among different government tiers. 
 
Keywords: Healthcare resources, Strategic substitutes, Decentralization, Spatial econometrics 
 
JEL codes: I10; H7; C21 
  
2 
1. Introduction 
The Chinese economy’s rapid growth has improved people’s living standards dramatically; 
however, increasing numbers of  residents are in poor health due to various internal and external causes, 
such as work-related stress, environmental pollution, and food safety. A national health and nutrition 
report revealed that one out of  two people on average who received physical examination are 
confronted with the threat of  poor health (Guangdong Society of  Nutrition, 2011).1 The “Triple H” 
(hypertension, hyperglycemia, and hyperlipidemia) phenomenon is becoming increasingly common 
across almost all levels of  ages from the young to the old.2 Numerous people suffer from obesity, 
osteoporosis, angiosclerosis, and other angiocardiopathy problems. According to the National Nutrition 
and Health Condition Investigation Report issued by the Ministry of  Health of  China in 2004, the 
overweight and obesity rates of  Chinese adults are 22.8% and 7.1%, respectively. These two rates 
increased by 39% and 97%, respectively, in ten years. In addition, approximately 160 million people 
suffer from dyslipidemia, and more than 160 million people suffer from hypertension. Health 
conditions are not only important for the human beings themselves but also for economic factors 
such as economic output, growth, productivity, and FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) at the national 
or regional level. The importance of  health conditions is widely examined in the academic literature 
(Arora, 2001; Mayer, 2001; Bloom, Canning, & Sevilla, 2004; Alsan, 2006; Cole & Neumayer, 2006; 
Acemoglu & Johnson, 2007; Weil, 2007; Liu, Dow, Fu, Akin, & Lance, 2008). 
Along with health problems, the demand for healthcare services is increasing. Taking two 
indicators as examples, number of  inpatients and times of  treatments, Fig. 1 shows that between 1994 
and 2008, both indicators greatly increased in China. Specifically, the number of  inpatients trends 
upward from 1994 and increases rapidly from 2000. In addition, the number of  inpatients doubled 
during the 2000-2008 period, with a growth rate of  75%. Turing to another index, the times of  
treatments in general are relatively stable during 1994-2003 and increase sharply afterward. Since 2003, 
the treatment times have increased from 1.28 billion to 1.9 billion with a growth rate of  approximately 
50%. 
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Fig. 1. Healthcare demand trend in China during 1994-2008 
Source: China Health Statistical Yearbook (various years) 
 
Despite the obviously increasing demand for healthcare services in the last few decades, the 
supply of  healthcare services has lagged behind. The relative shortage of  healthcare supply has caused 
several problems. There is anecdotal evidence indicating that “seeing a doctor is like fighting a battle, 
and making an appointment is like going through Spring Festival, China’s most important holiday for 
family reunion, travel season.” The number of  medical institutions, such as hospitals and clinics, 
decreased from 67,524 to 59,572 with a decreasing rate of  11% from 1994 to 2008 (Fig. 2). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Number of  medical institutions in China during 1994-2008 
Source: China Health Statistical Yearbook (various years) 
 
The imbalance between demand and healthcare service supply is apparent in Fig. 3, which 
represents the average growth rates of  five indices during 1998-2008. They are the number of  
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inpatients, times of  treatments, hospital beds, healthcare professionals, and medical institutions. The 
first two indices reflect the demand status, whereas the following three indices indicate the supply 
status of  healthcare services. On the demand side, the number of  inpatients grows the fastest at the 
rate of  8.23%; times of  treatments grow at 4.19%. On the supply-side, both the number of  medical 
professionals and hospital beds increase at the rates of  1% and 2%, respectively, and the number of  
medical institutions decreases at a rate of  1.12%. The demand for healthcare services grows much 
faster than the supply. 
During this decade, 1998-2008, China’s intergovernmental fiscal relationship is highly 
decentralized. Since the 1990s, local governments have financed approximately 70% of  total fiscal 
expenditures, an exceptionally high proportion even compared to other countries (OECD, 2006). 
These basic facts pose an interesting question concerning the role of  fiscal decentralization in the 
context of  China, where the provision of  healthcare services is mainly shouldered by local 
governments. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Growth rate of  healthcare demand and supply from 1998-2008 
Note: authors’ calculation based on China Statistical Yearbook. 
 
Research provides inconsistent answers. Collins & Green (1994) and Robalina, Picazo, & 
Voetberg (2001) posit that decentralization can improve access to healthcare and other social services 
by enhancing the participation of  the community in decision-making and implementation processes 
and strengthening local authorities who can better tailor staff, resources, and procedures to local 
circumstances compared to the central government. Frank & Gaynor (1994) use data from the states 
of  Ohio and Texas to examine the impacts of  fiscal decentralization on public mental healthcare. 
They find that fiscal decentralization leads to increased expenditures on healthcare services by local 
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governments. However, some studies find that fiscal decentralization is negatively related to the 
provision of  public goods and services. Singh (2008) examines delivery of  public healthcare services 
in India in the context of  decentralization and finds that decentralization aggravated public sector 
delivery of  healthcare. Pan (2010) finds that China’s fiscally decentralized system enables local 
governments to under-provide public healthcare services. Similar results are presented by UNDP 
(2000), Ping & Bai (2006), and Shen & Fu (2006). 
However, the existing literature ignores the possible presence of  spatial interactions across 
local jurisdictions due to fiscal decentralization. It is necessary to take the spatial interaction into 
consideration because of  two effects. First, healthcare service is a sort of  public good with low 
geographical restrictions. If  there are abundant healthcare provisions in neighboring regions that are 
able to meet local demand, local governments have reduced motivation to spend on healthcare, 
referred to as the substitution effect resulting from the spillover effect. Second, subnational 
governments in China are organized in a four-level hierarchy: the central government, provincial 
governments, city-level governments, county-level governments, and township-level governments. 
Each level of  government is supervised and evaluated by its next highest level. The government with 
better performance receives more support from the higher-level governments, and its officials have 
better chances at promotion. Thus, on one hand, local governments increase the overall supply of  
public goods to catch up to the public service level in neighboring areas, the catch-up effect. On the 
other hand, local governments might increase the productive public goods supply for projects such as 
highways, railways, and airports to attract capital and high-skilled labor, whereas the supply of  public 
services, such as education and healthcare, are reduced. We call this the competitive effect. Both effects 
make the spatial interaction an important factor when analyzing the relationship of  fiscal 
decentralization and local healthcare resource provision. 
This study contributes to the literature in two aspects. First, it considers different types of  
public healthcare services that could be affected differently by fiscal decentralization. This study uses 
China’s provincial panel data to investigate the determinants of  healthcare resource supply as 
represented by hospital beds and doctors, while paying particular attention to the role of  fiscal 
decentralization. Hence, unlike empirical studies by Westert & Groenewegen (1999), Papastergiou, 
Rachiotis, Polyzou, Zilidis, & Hadjichristodoulou (2008), Wang, Zhou, Zheng, Zhang, Wu, & Chen 
(2009), Chon (2010), and Hsu (2013), among others who focus on examining the possible effects of  
healthcare resource supply, such as supply of  hospital beds or medical staffs on health improvement, 
mortality, homicide rate, efficiency of  government spending on health, economic growth or other 
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indicators, we examine the related issue from a different angle. In other words, we examine the driving 
forces behind the healthcare resource supply. Second, we examine the mechanisms through which 
fiscal decentralization affects the public supply of  healthcare services by introducing the spatial 
interactions into the model using a city-level dataset. 
The primary finding of  this study is that the supply of  healthcare resources is inversely related 
to the degree of  decentralization in the first step. To elucidate the mechanisms that result in this 
negative relationship between fiscal decentralization and healthcare provision, in the second step, we 
find that the inverse relationship is attributed to the presence of  strategic substitutes in healthcare 
spending across city governments originating from the fiscal decentralization reform. 
Section 2 presents the panel model of  provincial healthcare resource supply, discusses the 
database, and describes the methodology. Section 3 reports the empirical results, with particular focus 
on the role of  fiscal decentralization. Section 4 further explores the mechanism through which fiscal 
decentralization can lead to under-provision of  healthcare resources by specifying a spatial model of  
city government healthcare expenditures. Finally, the last section concludes with some policy 
implications. 
 
2. Model, variables, and data 
 
The estimated model is, 
 
Healthcareit = β0 + β1Decentralizationit + β2Revenueit+ β3Edu_provinceit + β4Waterwasteit + β5Age14it + 
β6Age65it+β7Urbanizationit+ εit, i = 1,..., 31; t = 1994,..., 2006                        (1) 
 
where i denotes the province, and t denotes time. The dependent variable Healthcare indicates 
healthcare resources provided in province i at time t. In the empirical implementation, two variables, 
the number of hospital beds (Hospitalbed) and number of doctors (Doctor), are used as proxies. These 
two variables are taken from Comprehensive Statistical Materials on 60 Years of  the New China (1949-2008), 
which was published by the National Bureau of  Statistics (NBS). It is worth noting that Chongqing 
was part of Sichuan until it became a separate province in 1997. The NBS reports Sichuan and 
Chongqing data separately. We treat Chongqing as a separate province in this study. 
Decentralization, which is the major explanatory variable, measures the degree of fiscal 
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decentralization in China and is defined as the share of city governments’ own-source revenue within 
a province in total provincial own-source revenue. Specifically, Decentralizationit = (∑j=1
nown-source 
revenuejt)/total own-revenue of provinceit, where j represents the municipal-level city in province i, and n is 
the total number of municipal-level cities in province i. A higher ratio of this index indicates a higher 
degree of fiscal decentralization in the province and vice versa. The source of the city governments’ 
own-source revenue data is Prefecture- and County-level Public Finance Statistics, whereas the provincial 
own-source revenue data are from the Finance Yearbook of  China. Both statistical yearbooks are 
published by the Ministry of  Finance. In the context of  fiscal decentralization under which important 
expenditure responsibilities have been assigned from national to local governments, we hypothesize 
that decentralization reform gives local governments more autonomy than before to allocate more 
expenditures to categories, such as infrastructure, that could produce the most benefits/utility, that is, 
personal promotion, personal reappointment, or high economic growth; subsequently, the local 
government would be less motivated to take on improvements in education, social, and pollution 
programs that generate fewer, if  any, benefits to them. Thus, the first hypothesis to be formulated and 
tested is the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1. A higher degree of fiscal decentralization in a province is expected to lead to a 
lower supply of healthcare resources. 
 
In addition, the following factors are considered important to explain healthcare supply: Fiscal 
variables: The first fiscal variable is related to a provincial government’s own-source revenue (Revenue). 
This variable is defined as the provincial government’s own-source revenues divided by the total 
population of that province. It reflects the provincial government’s fiscal capability in allocating its 
funds to public healthcare services, and it is expected to be positively related to healthcare resource 
supplies. The source of a provincial government’s own-source revenue data is from the Finance 
Yearbook of  China, which is published by the Ministry of  Finance of  China; the population data are 
from the China Population Statistical Yearbook, which is published by the NBS. The second fiscal variable 
is related to education (Edu_province). It is measured as the percentage of total provincial public 
expenditure allocated to education. Education investments appear to be more attractive than 
healthcare investments in China as the former tends to be a more relevant index used by the central 
government to evaluate the provincial governors’ performance. It is important to note that, under 
constant budget constraints, a larger share of education expenditures crowds out other public 
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expenditures, including those for hospital beds and doctors. Hence, the coefficient of Edu_province is 
expected to be negative. In addition, high education expenditure implies a rise in local educational 
attainment. Hu & Hibel (2013) find that Chinese educational attainment promotes self-rated health 
by providing better work and economic condition, promoting a higher level of the sense of self-control, 
encouraging individuals to pay more attention to potential health issues, raising the frequencies of 
exercise, and increasing the frequencies of moderate drinking. Therefore, with the rise in educational 
attainment, demands for local healthcare services would drop. As a result, the local healthcare 
provision may decline. This scenario also explains the negative relationship between Edu_province and 
healthcare expenditure. The NBS is the source of the data on total public expenditures and public 
education expenditures. Data for the year 1994 are missing for all provinces, and we use an imputation 
method to replace these missing values. 
Demographic variables: This study considers three demographic variables: Age14, Age65, and 
Urbanization. Age14 measures the percentages of  total provincial population who are aged under 14, 
whereas Age65 is the percentages of  total provincial population who are aged above 65. Both 
demographic variables are expected to have positive effects on healthcare expenditure and thus 
positively related to the healthcare resource provision, as healthcare costs maintain a relatively high 
level for infants, decline sharply during the first few years of life and then rise, at first gradually, and 
then more sharply as the population ages (Di Matteo & Di Matteo, 1998). Urbanization is defined as 
the percentage of  total provincial population living in urban areas. Two opposing forces may dominate 
the overall impact of  urbanization rate on healthcare resource supplies. A higher urbanization rate 
may result in a greater demand for hospital beds and/or doctors. However, if  agglomeration 
economies exist that improve the efficiency of  healthcare resources and thus increase the return to 
healthcare resource supplies in urban areas, a higher urbanization rate may result in a lower supply. 
Thus, the expected sign of  such a variable as Urbanization is indeterminate. 
Environmental variable: One environmental variable is used: Waterwaste. This variable indicates 
per capita waste water emissions, which is an indicator of environmental pollution level.3 The 
discharge of water pollutants from medical organizations has long been a crucial concern of all levels 
of governments. In addition, the domestic waste water resulting from inpatients and their relatives 
should not be ignored either. Thus, one may expect that higher provision of healthcare resources is 
associated with a higher pollution level. Table 1 presents the variables used in the empirical model, the 
summary statistics, and data sources. 
Eq. (1) can be estimated using such approaches as the pooled OLS, the fixed effects model 
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(FEM), and the random effects model (REM). Each approach has advantages and disadvantages. The 
pooled OLS assumes neither spatial nor temporal effects among the panel data. Both FEM and REM 
address possible unobservable heterogeneity across provinces, yet one key assumption of  the REM 
model is that unobserved provincial effects are uncorrelated with exogenous variables. The F test, 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test, and Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) are used identify the fit of  each 
model. 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of  the healthcare resource supply panel model (1994-2006). 
 N Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent variable 
Hospitalbed (per 10 thousand population) 403  26.82  11.71  1.42   67.70 
Doctor (per 10 thousand population) 403  17.65   8.14  1.06   50.70 
Independent variable 
Decentralization (%) 403  44.11  19.29  8.25   98.17 
Revenue (per capita million yuan) 403   7.94  12.38  0.92  116.98 
Edu_province (%) 403  16.78   4.16  6.65   31.73 
Age14 (%) 403  20.86   7.07  1.32   37.51 
Age65 (%) 403   7.19   3.14  0.36   20.70 
Urbanization (%) 403  38.92  17.83  0.32   88.70 
Wastewater (per capita thousand tons) 403 202.95 165.52 17.29 1,282.23 
Sources: NBS (various years); MOF (various years). 
Note: Missing data are imputed using the MI command in Stata 13. 
 
3. Statistical findings 
 
Table 2 reports the fixed effects regression results of  the healthcare resource supplies model 
based on Eq. (1). Both standardized and unstandardized coefficient estimates are presented. The 
results from all tests indicate that the FEM is preferable to REM and pooled OLS. As seen from Table 
2, regardless of  the variable proxy for healthcare resource, the Hospitalbed or Doctor, the coefficient of  
Decentralization, the primary variable of  interest, is negative and statistically significant at a 1% level, 
implying that a higher level of  fiscal decentralization is associated with a lower level supply of  hospital 
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beds or doctors – hypothesis 1. This result is not only in line with our hypothesis that the fiscal 
decentralization reform that took place in the early 1990s plays a role in explaining the slowdown of  
healthcare resource growth but is also consistent with Singh (2008). However, these results contradict 
Frank & Gaynor (1994) and Costa-Font & Pons-Novell (2007). 
The coefficient of  Revenue, a provincial government’s fiscal revenue, is inconsistent when the 
dependent variable is Hospitalbed instead of  Doctor. The education expenditure share of  provincial 
public expenditure, Edu_province, carries unexpected positive signs in both regressions, which could 
imply that public expenditure on education and healthcare services are complementary, i.e., that a local 
government would not simply cut back on either category of  expenditure to increase another. 
Wastewater, the environmental variable measuring waste water emissions, is statistically significant and 
carries the expected positive sign in both models. A higher value of Urbanization, a higher proportion 
of  the population living in the urban area, is positively related to the healthcare resource supplies. With 
respect to the other two demographic variables, Age14 and Age65, the results did not meet our 
expectations. Age14 appears to have no significant effect on hospital bed provision nor number of  
doctors per 10,000 persons; the Age65 variable is inversely related to the number of  hospital beds, 
which differs from our initial expectation. 
Since the fiscal decentralization reform in 1994, more fiscal expenditure allocation rights have 
been held by local governments. This implies that local governments are entitled to more control over 
healthcare resource supplies. As suggested in the above analysis, fiscal decentralization exhibits a 
negative instead of  positive effect on healthcare resource supplies. What is the mechanism through 
which fiscal decentralization negatively affects healthcare resource supplies? The following section 
uncovers the mechanism through further empirical analysis of  city governments’ fiscal behaviors in 
terms of  healthcare expenditure in China. 
 
Table 2 Fixed effects regression results of  healthcare resource supply model. 
 Hospital bed  Doctor 
 Unstd. coef. Std. coef.  Unstd. coef. Std. coef. 
Intercept 22.460*** (1.380)   16.980*** (0.991)  
Fiscal variables     
Decentralization −0.562*** (0.127) −0.926   −2.476*** (0.836) −5.868 
Revenue 11.420*** (3.291) 12.073   −8.424** (3.992) −12.812  
Edu_province 14.930***(3.36) 5.304    5.406** (2.41) 2.763  
Demographic variables     
Age14   7.429 (5.159) 4.485   13.290 (8.630) 11.543  
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Age65 −13.660**(5.965) −3.663   −31.150** (12.510) −12.016  
Urbanization   2.532* (1.353) 3.855     1.996** (0.970) 4.372  
Environmental variable     
Wastewater   0.024* (0.014) 0.339   0.09* (0.047) 1.830  
Time fixed effects No   No  
N 403   403  
No. of provinces 31   31  
F test for fixed 
effects 
263.91 [0.0000] 
  
247.67 [0.0000] 
 
LM test for random 
effects 
1,794.88 [0.0000] 
  
1,252.83 [0.0000] 
 
Hausman test  165.23 [0.0000]     39.50 [0.0002]  
Likelihood ratio test 
for time fixed effects 
  15.37 [0.2217] 
  
  12.23 [0.4275] 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note: “Unstd. (Std.) coef.” refers to “Unstandardized (Standardized) coefficient”. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. p values are reported in brackets. * p < .1. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. 
 
4. Further analysis 
 
The second hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 2. City governments do not act alone in allocating their public expenditure 
categories. 
 
Given the fact that healthcare supply has a spillover or free-riding effect, city governments 
consider their neighbors’ healthcare spending decisions in their own decision-making process. To 
capture the potential interactions across city decision-makers, we follow Hoel (1991) by introducing a 
simple model with spatial spillovers concerning a public healthcare spending game. Specifically, there 
are two cities, i = 1, 2, in this noncooperative game. Each city’s public healthcare spending is Xi (i = 
1, 2). The payoff  function to each city is specified as, 
                       πi = Bi(X1 + X2) – Ci(Xi)                             (2) 
where Bi is the benefit function which depends on total healthcare spending, and Ci is the cost function 
which depends on the healthcare spending of  city i. Assuming that Bi' > 0, Bi'' < 0, Ci' > 0, and Ci'' > 
0, we total differentiate Eq. (2) with respect to X1 and get the following first order condition to 
maximize the payoff, 
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            dπ1/dX1 = B1'(X1 + X2) - C1'(X1) = 0, or B1'(X1 + X2) = C1'(X1)          (3) 
This defines X1 as a function of  X2, which is called the response function of  city 1, and denoted by 
R1(X2). From Eq. (3) we have, 
                      R1'(X2) = −B1''/(B1'' − C1'') < 0                        (4) 
Similarly, city 2’s optimal response to city 1’s choice of  X1 is given by, 
                           B2'(X1 + X2) = C2'(X2)                          (5) 
which yields city 2’s response function as, 
                         R2'(X1) = −B2''/( B2'' − C2'') < 0                    (6) 
 
 
Fig. 4. Nash Equilibrium of  public healthcare spending 
 
Fig. 4 illustrates these two response functions. Their intersection at point E is the Nash 
equilibrium where the set of  strategies (X1
*, X2
*) satisfies Eqs. (3) and (5), i.e., X1
* = R1(X2
*) and X2
* 
= R2(X1
*). Following Eqs. (4) and (6) we conclude that the decision-makings of  these two cities are 
strategic substitutes. In other words, if  one city increases its public spending expenditure, the 
neighboring city may cut its own spending as a response. This suggests that positive spillovers exist in 
cities’ healthcare public expenditures. 
Thus, we hypothesize that, in a decentralized healthcare system, city governments would not 
act alone but behave strategically in regards to education, social, and pollution programs. In other 
words, intergovernmental fiscal interactions could cause a lower level of  public healthcare resource 
supply. The hypothesis is tested empirically in the following section using a spatial econometric 
technique. 
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4.1 Spatial model 
 
The empirical model of  municipal-level public healthcare expenditure without accounting for 
spatial effect can be specified as follows: 
Expense_cityi = αιn+ Xiβ + єi, є ~ N(0, σ
2In), i = 1,…, 245             (7) 
where Expense_city is a n × 1 vector of  dependent variables denoting per capita government spending 
on healthcare in city i. The source for government spending on healthcare is from the Prefecture- and 
County-level Public Finance Statistics (2007) from the Ministry of  Finance of  China, whereas the 
population data are from China City Statistical Yearbook (2007) published by NBS. ιn is a n × 1 vector of  
ones associated with the constant term parameter α. ε is the error term, and β is the parameter to be 
estimated. X is a set of  explanatory variables that are identified to affect deviations of  a city 
government’s healthcare expenditures. They are classified as follows: 
Fiscal variables: There are two-fold spatial effects of  municipal-level healthcare expenditure: 
first, the vertical spatial effect, which includes the interaction of  healthcare expenditure between the 
provincial and city governments and between the city and county governments and second, the 
horizontal spatial effect, which results from the interaction of  healthcare expenditure between the city 
governments. Thus, it is necessary to include the variables of  Expense_province and Expense_county, 
which measure per capita healthcare expenditure spent by the provincial and county governments, 
respectively, in the municipal-level healthcare expenditure model to identify the true horizontal spatial 
effects of  public healthcare spending across city governments. The effects of  these two variables on 
municipal-level public healthcare spending are hypothesized to be theoretically negative as a higher 
level of  healthcare expenditure in vertical governments would place less burden on the city’s 
government because of  the nonexclusive characteristic of  healthcare resources, the so-called 
substitution effect. Thus, there are reasons to believe that a city government may decrease its 
healthcare expenditures as a response to the increase of  its higher- and lower-level governments’ 
healthcare expenditures. The third fiscal variable is related to education (Education_city), which is 
defined as the percentage of city public expenditures on education programs. Similar to the arguments 
in Section 2, the coefficient sign on Education_city is ambiguous. The fiscal data are taken from the 
Prefecture- and County-level Public Finance Statistics (2007). 
Supply-side variables: This study includes two supply-side variables: Hospitalbed_city and Doctor_city. 
They indicate, respectively, the number of  per capita hospital beds and doctors in the city. They are 
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expected to be positively related to the dependent variable. The source for these two supply variables 
is the China City Statistical Yearbook (2007). 
Economic/Demographic variables: Two variables are used. GDP_city is per capita city-level GDP, 
which is used to reflect the spending capacity of  that city. The source for these two supply variables 
is the China City Statistical Yearbook (2007). We expect a positive relationship between GDP_city and the 
dependent variable, whereas, Urbanization_city captures the urbanization ratio of  the city, which is 
defined as the percentage of  total city population living in urban areas. Similar to the arguments in 
Section 2, the coefficient sign on Urbanization_city is ambiguous. 
Environmental variables: We consider three environmental indicators in this study. Waterwaste_city, 
SO2_city, and Pollution_city, which are three environment-related variables, are defined as waste water 
emissions per square meter, industrial sulfur dioxide emissions per square meter, and per capita 
environmental pollution investment at the municipal level, respectively. The source for these 
environmental variables is also the China City Statistical Yearbook (2007) as well. Both Waterwaste_city and 
SO2_city are expected to be positively related to healthcare expenditure because of  the reasons 
presented in Section 2, whereas the variable Pollution_city may be endogenously determined and can be 
positively or negatively related to the healthcare spending. More investments in pollution may reduce 
the possibility of  people getting sick and going to the hospital, which implies that less spending on 
healthcare is required. However, a high level of  pollution investment in a city indicates that the city 
has already had a severe environmental pollution issue and thus might maintain a higher level of  
healthcare expenditures. Mining_city is the ratio of  total employees in the mining sector, which reflects 
the city’s industrial structure. The coefficient on this variable is supposed to be positive as a larger 
value of  the ratio implies that the city is heavily dependent on secondary industries and has more 
environmental problems, and hence a higher level of  healthcare spending is required than other cities 
with relatively smaller ratios. 
The summary statistics of  the variables used in this part of  analysis are presented in Table 3. 
The data for these economic, demographic, and environmental variables are taken from the China City 
Statistical Yearbook, whereas the fiscal variables are from the Prefecture- and County-level Public Finance 
Statistics. We obtained a total number of 245 Chinese prefecture-level cities in 2006 after combing data 
from these two data sources. 
The OLS approach may be properly applied to describe the relationship among Chinese cities’ 
public healthcare spending in disregard of  the spatial effect. However, the spatial effect undoubtedly 
exists in terms of  public healthcare spending among cities because of  two opposite forces. On one 
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hand, city governments compete with each other as the provincial government evaluates the 
performance of  local governors periodically, and the healthcare condition is one of  numerous criteria 
applied. Therefore, a higher share of  healthcare spending in the neighboring cities would, ceteris paribus, 
encourage a city’s government to spend more on healthcare resources because of  the catch up effect. 
On the other hand, similar to the substitution effect, a city’s public healthcare resources are actually a 
type of  shared resource among cities, which do not prevent residents of  other cities from taking 
advantage of  them. If  a city offers good healthcare services, which indicates a relatively higher share 
of  healthcare spending, residents of  nearby cities will be attracted, and the demand for healthcare 
resources in those neighboring cities will drop, resulting in reduced local healthcare expenditures. In 
addition, the healthcare service is a relatively less-productive public service; due to the aforementioned 
competitive effect, the city government’s spending on local healthcare resources, ceteris paribus, will 
diminish if  the local government obtains more fiscal controls. 
 
Table 3 
Summary statistics of  public healthcare expenditure model (245 cities in year 2006). 
 Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent variable     
Expense_city (yuan/person)  28.45  46.74   1.83 616.25 
Independent variable     
Expense_county (yuan/person)  52.11  27.28   9.74 217.05 
Expense_province (yuan/person) 260.19 227.54  41.13   1.70e+0.3 
Education_city (%)   8.47   4.11   0.84  24.23 
Hospitalbed_city (no.) 208.88 159.10   7.00   1.38e+03 
Doctor_city (no.)    5.92e+03   4.34e+03 377.00   2.73e+04 
GDP_city (yuan)    1.81e+04   1.44e+04   2.77e+03   9.60e+04 
Urbanization_city (%)  12.13  14.72   1.05  95.06 
Waterwaste_city (10,000 ton/km2)   0.93    1.47   0.00   11.23 
SO2_city (ton/km
2)   7.91    9.90   0.06   67.96 
Pollution_city (yuan/person) 210.94 351.28   0.74 3,882.15 
Mining_city (%)   6.34  10.32   0.00   55.20 
Sources: MOF (2007) for all fiscal variables (Expense_city, Expense_county, Expense_province, 
Education_city); NBS (2007) for the rest variables. 
 
In the presence of  the spatial effect of  healthcare spending among cities, the OLS estimation 
will not yield consistent estimates (Anselin, 1988), so other estimation approaches are required. 
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Conventionally, there are two types of  spatial dependence. One type assumes that the spatial 
correlation is reflected in the dependent variable and the spatial lag/autoregressive model (SAR) is 
used to find out this correlation. The other type specifies that the spatial correlation exists in the 
disturbance term, and the spatial error model (SEM) helps capture this correlation. These two types 
of  spatial correlation are commonly observed in the spatial econometric literature. 
To specify the SAR model, the classical linear regression model in Eq. (7) is rebuilt as 
Expense_city= αιn + λW*Expense_city + Xβ + є, є ~ N(0, σ
2In), n =1, …, 245            (8) 
where W is the nonstochastic n × n spatial weight matrix in which the element mij is posited as being 
inverse functions of  the distance between cities i and j (i ≠ j) (Anselin, 1988; Moscone, 2007; Baltagi, 
Blien, & Wolf, 2012; Yu, Zhang, Li, & Zheng, 2012).3 Let dij denote the great-circle distance between 
cities i and j, then mij can be derived from the following expression:
4 mij = 1/dij, (i ≠ j). β, σ
2, and λ are 
the parameters to be estimated. β and σ2 are the usual regression parameters, and λ is the additional 
spatial lag parameter, which captures the magnitude of  spatial dependence across cities. This spatial 
lag parameter is the most important coefficient in that it allows us to test the spatial interaction 
hypothesis. Anselin (1998) suggests that in the case of  spatially lagged dependence, the estimates from 
traditional OLS are biased and inconsistent as the autoregressive component of  the model is 
correlated with residuals. Thus, the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) method should be applied 
instead. 
To specify the SEM model, Eq. (7) is reformed as 
Expense_city = αιn + Xβ + μ, μ = ρW*μ + v, v ~ N(0, σ
2In), n = 1, …, 245.          (9) 
Compared with Eq. (8), the spatial weight matrix W is put in the error term here. Although OLS 
estimation yields unbiased estimates in the presence of  spatial correlation among model disturbances, 
estimates of  the standard errors are inconsistent. Thus, the MLE method is still preferred when 
spatially correlated disturbances are considered. In the empirical implementation session, we will 
conduct several tests to determine if  the SAR or SEM model is preferable. 
 
4.2 Spatial results 
 
The regression results are presented in the Table 4. Columns 2 and 3 show, respectively, the 
estimating results for the unstandardized and standardized coefficients. Some pretesting results are 
also reported from the OLS model. First, the result from the Jarque-Bera (1981) test is found to be 
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insignificant at a 5% level of  significance, revealing that the OLS errors are considered to be normally 
distributed, which paves the way for a spatial dependence test based on the assumption of  normal 
distribution. Second, Moran’s (1950) I test on the residuals derived from the OLS model indicates 
significant spatial dependence in the data. However, further information is required to judge if  the 
spatial correlation should be considered in the dependent variable or in the error term or in both. To 
guide the specification search, two different sets of  Lagrange Multiplier tests can be used, which are 
the LM-Error and LM-Lag tests and their robust versions.5 Although the LM-Error test gives an 
insignificant result, the robust LM-error test is significant at a 1% level of  significance. Both LM-Lag 
and robust LM-Lag tests are significant as well. Thus, both spatial lag and spatial error effects are 
presented simultaneously in the classical regression model. As a result, it is reasonable to adopt a 
spatial mixed model, namely the SAC model, which combines the features of  both the SAR and SEM 
models. 
The results of  the spatial mixed model are reported in the columns 4 and 5 of  Table 4.6 The 
autoregressive lag parameter, λ, is most interesting as it captures the magnitude of  spatial dependence 
across cities. The spatial lag parameter is negative and significant at a 1% level of significance. This 
result suggests that, in a decentralized healthcare system, a city government appears to cut its own 
spending on healthcare by 1.186 units (standard deviations) as a response to a one unit of standard 
deviation increase in the healthcare expenditures of its neighboring cities. This empirical finding 
indeed supports hypothesis 2, city governments engage in strategic interaction in spending-decisions 
on healthcare programs; moreover, the substitution effect and competitive effect take priority over 
the catch-up effect. 
Turning to other explanatory variables, Expense_province, the vertical variable, is significantly 
and negatively related to the dependent variable as expected, whereas Expense_county, the other vertical 
variable, has a significant and positive relationship with public expenditures on healthcare by the city-
level governments, which was unexpected. GDP_city is positively associated with public healthcare 
expenditure. Specifically, as city-level GDP increases by one standard deviation or 14.4 thousand yuan, 
ceteris paribus, city government’s healthcare spending increases by 3,900 standard deviations, or 0.18 
million yuan. The coefficient for the pollution investment variable is also positive, yet the coefficient 
size may be overestimated because of the above-mentioned possible endogeneity problem. 
Urbanization rate is significantly and positively related to the public healthcare spending of city 
government. In addition, the education ratio carries the expected negative sign. There is no significant 
evidence of the effects of the two supply-side variables, Hospitalbed_city and Doctor_city, on the 
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dependent variable. In relation to the two environment-related variables that are expected to affect 
the public healthcare expenditures, waste water emissions have no significant effect, whereas sulfur 
dioxide emissions are significantly related to the dependent variable but carry the unexpected negative 
sign. 
 
Table 4 Regression results of  public healthcare spending in Chinese cities, 2006. 
 OLS model  Spatial mixed model 
 Unstd. coef. Std. coef.  Unstd. coef. Std. coef. 
Intercept −5.419 (4.66)   24.499*** (9.61)  
Fiscal variables      
Expense_county  0.178*** (0.06) 0.104   0.224*** (0.06) 0.131 
Expense_province −0.013 (0.01) −0.063  −0.015** (0.01) −0.073 
Education_city −0.385 (0.30) −0.034  −0.242** (0.29) −0.021 
Supply-side variables      
Hospitalbed_city  2.950e-04 (0.00) 8.03e-05   0.249 (0.15) 0.068 
Doctor_city −0.278 (0.21) −0.045  −0.473 (0.29) −0.076 
Economic/Demog. variables     
GDP_city  9.460*** (1.67) 3.6e+03   9.050*** (1.55) 3.9e+03 
Urbanization_city  0.746*** (0.07) 0.505   0.725*** (0.07) 0.490 
Environmental variables     
Waterwaste_city −2.269* (1.29) −0.066  −1.511 (1.28) −0.044 
SO2_city −0.518
*** (0.17) −0.103  −0.548*** (0.16) −0.109 
Pollution_city  0.022*** (0.00) 0.197   0.024*** (0.00) 0.215 
Mining_city  0.094 (0.13) 0.021   0.029 (0.12) 0.006 
λ (spatial lag parameter)   −1.186*** (0.31) −1.186 
ρ (spatial error parameter)    0.631*** (0.24)  0.631 
R-squared  0.85     
N 245   245  
Jarque-Bera normality test 4.85 [0.0885]     
Diagnostics Test  
  
 
 
Moran’s I  2.878 [0.004]     
LM-Error  2.147 [0.143]     
Robust LM-Error 10.655 [0.001]     
LM_Lag  4.275 [0.039]     
Robust LM_Lag 12.783 [0.000]     
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note: “Unstd. (Std.) coef.” refers to “Unstandardized (Standardized) coefficient”. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. p values are reported in brackets. * p < .1. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. 
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5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
This study performs two major tasks. First, a longitudinal dataset of 31 Chinese provinces 
covering 1994-2006 explores the impact of fiscal decentralization on healthcare resources whose 
outlays are mainly shouldered by local governments. During the period of interest, despite the ever-
growing demand for healthcare resources, the supply of healthcare resources have lagged behind. Such 
a supply shortage partially explains the reason why seeing a doctor is so difficult in China. The results 
of the fixed effects model indicate that a higher degree of fiscal decentralization is associated with 
lower healthcare supply when other covariates are controlled for, hypothesis 1. 
Next, to elucidate the mechanisms through which fiscal decentralization leads to lower public 
supply of healthcare resources, the determinants of city government’s expenditure on healthcare 
resources are examined using a spatial econometric technique. The main finding is that city-level 
governments appear to interact as strategic substitutes in healthcare spending as a result of  the fiscal 
decentralization, hypothesis 2. In particular, a city government appears to reduce its own spending as 
a response to the increase in healthcare expenditure of its neighboring cities. Such a result implies that 
in a decentralized health system where more public spending powers are returned to local governments, 
local healthcare provision is reduced because of the competitive effect and substitution effect. 
The reasons for healthcare resource shortages are too complicated to be fully understood, but 
this paper sheds some light. Although the local government may better know the healthcare demands 
of  the jurisdiction under its control and thus be able to better allocate the resources, this study 
indicates that fiscal decentralization is not good for stimulating the provision of  less productive public 
goods such as healthcare services. 
To better develop the advantages of  fiscal decentralization and weaken its negative effects on 
healthcare provision, we suggest that, first, the local governments assign a fixed percentage of  their 
fiscal budgets to renew healthcare resources, and the central government should effectively supervise 
the implementation of  this policy. The percentage should be determined by both central and local 
governments, depending on local demand for healthcare services as well as other factors, such as local 
economy, population, age structure, and so on. 
Second, in addition to the local government’s expenditure on healthcare services, the central 
government should also allocate a fund for local healthcare resource supply that is only for 
compensating for local government shortages. Third, the official promotion system and performance 
evaluation system should be transformed. In addition to the economic growth rate, the evaluation 
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criteria should also include the improvement of  residents’ welfare, happiness, and health condition, 
among other factors. 
Notes 
1 Under the direction of  the Public Nutrition and Development Center of  National 
Development and Reform Commission, By-HEALTH, a leader and benchmark enterprise in the 
Chinese dietary supplement market and the first in the Chinese healthcare industry to earn an AAA 
credit rating, and the Guangdong Society for Nutrition, the BY-HEALTH National Health Report 
was jointly issued in 2011. For more information on BY-HEALTH, please refer to http://www.by-
health.com.cn/en/about.aspx and http://health.people.com.cn/mediafile/201112/14/P201112141 
332141781023641.pdf. 
2 Existing literature uses other indexes to reflect pollution level. For instance, Karatzas (2000) 
uses per capita emissions of  industrial waste gas, whereas Or (2002) uses per capita NOx emissions as 
a proxy for pollution severity. 
3 Another commonly used weight matrix specification is the contiguity-based binary matrix in 
which each element mij of  the matrix W is set to one if  cities i and j (i ≠ j) share a common border, 
and zero otherwise (Anselin, 1988; Moscone, 2007; Baltagi, 2012). 
4 The great-circle distance is the shortest distance between two points on the surface of  a 
sphere measured along the surface of  the sphere. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Great-circle_distance. 
5. Detailed mathematical derivations of the LM test statistics can be found in Anselin (1988) 
and Anselin & Florax (1995). 
6 The analysis of  the spatial mixed model in this empirical study is performed using LeSage 
(1999) MATLAB spatial econometrics toolbox, which is available at http://www.spatial-
econometrics.com. 
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